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HARVARD LAW REVIEW

IS THE CRIME OF PIRACY OBSOLETE?
I
A

FEW years ago it might have been surmised that in
America at least a good deal of the old code in respect to
piracy had passed from the law in reserve into the law in history.
The important cases were nearly all one hundred years old or
more. It was commonly supposed that the seas were policed effectively. While Kidd, Bonnet, and Blackbeard were still
familiar personages in chromatic fiction, there seemed no great
likelihood that their trials would be revived as precedents in the
more sober business of administering justice.'
There have been recent events, however, which challenge the
assumption that the law of piracy is chiefly of historical significance. The country had hardly entered upon the new period of
national prohibition when the rum ships descended upon its
coasts. Some retailed liquor over the rail outside the three-mile
limit. Others rushed it ashore as often as vigilance relaxed.
The business was not, to put the matter mildly, an object of the
law's most solicitous protection; and it was rumored that enormous profits were being made. There sprang up, in consequence,
to prey upon the rum ships, a new breed of buccaneers whose
exploits have revived in memory the hardy pirates of old.
Now the "hi-jackers," as these new buccaneers have been
called, are robbers of an unusually daring sort. Their highway
is the sea, their object plunder. They seize by violence or by
putting in fear. As the event has proved, they take human life
whenever it seems essential to the accomplishment of their purpose. While their operations are more restricted in scope than
werd those of the pirates of old, they are animated, it may be assumed, by much the same combination of cupidity and thirst for
adventure.
I In an article on the law of piracy, published in x874, Mr. A. T. Whatley
remarked that at that time there seemed " very little occasion for such a law."
"Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy," 3 LAw MAG. AND Rxv. (3d Series), 536,
618, 639.
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Are those who engage in so-called "hi-jacking" upon the
seas to be regarded as pirates? Would it be appropriate, for
example, to indict for piracy those American citizens who recently boarded a Canadian rum ship lying twelve miles or more
off the Massachusetts shore, shot the captain and cook, and
made off with as much money as they found on board? 2 Deeds
of violence are reported currently along either coast.2 a Is the law
of piracy applicable? District attorneys are said to have found
the question more difficult than was anticipated. The Department of Justice has given the problem some attention, though to
date there has been no satisfactory occasion for proceeding to a
precedent. So it seems worth while, at a time when new circumstances have aroused new interest in this neglected subject, to
explore briefly the crime of piracy with particular reference to
its place and significance in the law of the United States.

II
There is encountered, at the outset, one characteristic feature
of the crime of piracy which makes it uniquely difficult as well
as uniquely interesting. It has long been regarded as an international crime as well as a crime by municipal law. As an international crime it is within the jurisdiction of all maritime states
wheresoever or by whomsoever committed. Since it is not always
2 The J. M. Hankensen case. The incident occurred before the ratification
of the recent treaty with Great Britain. It was first called to the author's
attention through the courtesy of M. R. Norcop, Esq., of the Department of
Justice. For adequate reasons it has never reached the stage of a reported
decision.
2a Two such incidents have been reported recently, one an attack on a French
ship off New York by a party of Americans under a Canadian leader, said to have
matched in thrills " the tales of the old Spanish Main," and the other an attack
on a liquor-laden vessel later found " adrift and abandoned off the San Juan
Islands, sixty miles north of Seattle, with blood-spattered decks and sides." In
connection with the latter incident four arrests were said to have been made at
Seattle and one at Vancouver, B. C., and it was said that the Attorney General
at Vancouver had retained special counsel to prosecute those under arrest. See
The New York Times, Nov. 28, 1924, p. I.
It has also been reported that coast guard officials have asked the advice of the
Department of Justice on the question of the possibility of dealing with the "hijackers" as pirates. See The New York Sunday World, Dec. 21, I924, p. S.
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easy to distinguish satisfactorily between piracy as an international crime and piracy by municipal law, it is sometimes difficult to know whether the jurisdiction is international or exclusively national. Piracy as an international crime, moreover, has
been associated in times past with the activities of those bold
adventurers who have taken the character of outlaws and plundered all commerce without discrimination. There has been a
tendency to assume, in consequence, that only those are true
international pirates and the subjects of universal jurisdiction
who maraud as the enemies of all mankind? It is evident that
there can be no certainty about the application of the law of
piracy to modern marauders upon the sea until these questions
have been satisfactorily resolved.
By way of approach to these questions it will be well enough
to begin with piracy jure gentium as it has been traditionally
understood in English and American law. Characteristically it
has been regarded as an offence of the open seas.4 Its mode is
that of the highwayman, namely, violence or intimidation.6 Its
object is usually plunder.6 While the definition is not allinclusive, English and American courts have usually referred to
3 See i HYbE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, § 232.

4 See i HYDE, op. Ci., § 231; 1 OPPENHEIm, INTERNATioAL LAW, 3 ed., § 277.
5" The act of violence need not be consummated: a mere attempt, such as
attacking or even chasing a vessel for the purpose of attack, by itself comprises
piracy. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether persons cruising in armed
vessels with the intention of committing piracies are liable to be treated as
pirates before they have committed a single act of violence." " OPP_,HEUh, op.
Cit, § 276.
It has been held that the captain's fraudulent conversion of vessel or cargo
entrusted to him is not piracy. The King v. Mason, 8 Mod. 74 (1723). See
also the opinion of Attorney General Wirt, 2 Op. A=. GEN. ig (1825).
6 "The object of piracy is any public or private vessel, or the persons or
the goods thereon, whilst on the open sea. In the regular case of piracy the
pirate wants to make booty; it is the cargo of the attacked vessel which is the
centre of his interest, and he might free the vessel and the crew after having
appropriated the cargo. But he remains a pirate, whether he does so or whether
he kills the crew and appropriates the ship, or sinks her. On the other hand,
the cargo need not be the object of his act of violence. If he stops a vessel
and takes a rich passenger off with the intention of keeping him for the purpose of a high ransom, his act is piracy: it is likewise piracy if he stops a vessel
merely to kill a certain person only on board, although he may afterwards free
vessel, crew, and cargo." I OPPENE IM, op. Cit., § 275.
It has been held that kidnapped negroes who rose in. revolt, killed the captain,
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piracy by the law of nations as robbery committed upon the
high seas.
Charging the jury of an Admiralty Sessions in .668, Sir
Leoline Jenkins said:
"That which is called robbing upon the highway,, the same being
done upon the water, is called piracy: Now robbery, as 'tis distinguished
from thieving or larceny, implies not only the actual taking away of
my goods, while I am, as we say, in peace, but also the putting me
in fear, by taking them away by force and arms out of my hands, or
in my sight and presence; when this is done upon the sea, without a
lawful commission of war or reprisals, it is downright piracy." 7
Sir Charles Hedges charged the grand jury in Dawson's Trial 8
at the Old Bailey in 1696 that "piracy is only a sea-term for
robbery, piracy being a robbery committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty." In Bonnet's Trial I at Charlestown,
in 1718, Judge Nicholas Trott declared that "piracy is a robbery

committed upon the sea, and a pirate is a sea thief." In United
States v. Smith,'0 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1820, Mr. Justice Story remarked that
" whether we advert to writers on the common law, or the maritime
law, or the law of nations, we shall find that they universally treat
of piracy as an offense against the law of nations, and that its true

definition by that law is robbery upon the sea."
and took possession of the ship on which they were being transported between
Cuban ports were not pirates. United States v. The Schooner Amistad, i5 Pet.
(U. S.) 518, 593 (1841). But cf. Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-aSing, L. R. 5 P. C. i79 (i873), discussed infra, p. 354.
7 1 Wy=nn, Lira or JENKINS, lxxxvi.
8

13 How. St. Tr. 451, 454 (1696).

9 i5 How. St. Tr. 1231, 1234 (,718).
10 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 153, x62 (1820).

See the note in which are assembled

numerous definitions from writers on the civil law, the maritime law, the common law, and the law of nations, all in substantial accord with the definition
adopted by Mr. justice Story. 5 Wheat. (U. S.) at 163-180. See Davison v.
Seal-skins, 2 Paine, 324, 333 (2d Circ., 1833) ; United States v. Baker, 5 Blatchf.
6, 11-12 (2d Circ., i86x); Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co.,
2 Cliff. 394, 415-419 (ist Circ., 1864); The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408, 416
(S. D. N. Y., i885). See also EAsT P. C., c. I7, § 3; MOLLOY, DE JuRE MArimlo,
6 ed., Book I, c. 4, § 1; 2 WOODDSoN, LacruRas, 422; 3 KENT CoTIEN. 171; 1
RUSsELL, CRImns, 9th Am. from 4 th Eng. ed., 142.
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Since piracy jure gentium is a kind of robbery, pirates acquire
no rights in the plunder taken and in general transfer no rights
to those who purchase from them. A piratis et latronibus capta
dominium non mutant is the familiar maxim." As regards punishment, the traditional penalty was death. There is no rule
obliging nations to exact the supreme penalty, however, and at
the present day the municipal laws of some states prescribe a less
rigorous punishment."a
Pirates are usually robbers, and of all robbers they are
peculiarly obnoxious because they maraud upon the open seas,
the great highway of all maritime nations. So heinous is the offence considered, so difficult are such offenders to apprehend, and
so universal is the interest in their prompt arrest and punishment, that they have long been regarded as outlaws and the
enemies of all mankind. They are international criminals. It
follows that they may be arrested by the authorized agents of any
state and taken in for trial anywhere. The jurigdiction is
universal.
Thus the famous Captain Kidd, who was sent out originally to
exterminate pirates in the eastern seas, was commissioned to arrest pirates "being eitlter our own subjects, or of any other
nations associated with them." 11 Sir Charles Hedges charged
the grand jury in Dawson's Trial that
"The king of England hath not only an empire and sovereignty over
the British seas, but also an undoubted jurisdiction and power, in
concurrency with other princes and states, for the punishment of all
piracies and robberies at sea, in the most remote parts of the world;
so that if any person whatsoever, native or foreigner, Christian or
Infidel, Turk or Pagan, with whose country we have no war, with
whom we hold trade and correspondence, and are in amity, shall be
robbed or spoiled in the Narrow Seas, the Mediterranean, Atlantic,
Southern, or any other seas, or the branches thereof, either on this
a See Bonnet's Trial, iS How. St. Tr. 1231, 1236 (,718).
QUAESTIONum JuRis PUBLICI, Lib. I, c. 17; 2 WOODDESo,

Comm.

See

BYNEERSHOEK,

LECTURES, 429; 1 KENT

172.

12 Imprisonment for life has been substituted for the death penalty in the
United States. See Act of 1897; 29 STAT. AT L. 487. Transportation or imprisonment has been substituted in Great Britain, except in case of piracy aggravated by assault. See 7 WMr IV. & i Vicr., C. 88; 5 & 6 ViCr., c. 28, § x6.
13 Kidd's Trial, i4 How. St. Tr. X23, 172 (1701).
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or the other side of the line, it is piracy within the limits of your
enquiry, and the cognizance of this court." 14
Other maritime nations have asserted a jurisdiction equally comprehensive.

III
It may be said, therefore, that English and American courts
have conceived of piracy by the law of nations as comprehending
typically the case of robbery, and occasionally, if the definition

is to be inclusive, the case of other unauthorized acts of violence
against persons or property, committed upon the open seas. The

jurisdiction to arrest and punish has been regarded as universal.
Piracy by municipal law, on the other hand, comprehends as
much or as little as the law-making authority of the particular
state may choose to make it, and pirates by municipal law are

offenders only against the law of the state concerned.

Jurisdic-

tion to arrest and punish must be confined to the particular state,
and depends either upon the allegiance of the offender or the

locality of the offence as well as upon the nature of the offence
committed.

It is evident that the same acts may constitute

piracy by the law of nations and by municipal law and that there
is possibility of confusion between the two.'
11 13 How. St. Tr. at 455. See Bonnet's Trial, 15 How. St. Tr. X231, 1234
(i718); The Marianna Flora, 3 Mason, i6, 120-X2X (ist Circ., 1822), aff'd in
xi Wheat. (U. S.) i, 40 (1826); Dole v. New England Mutual Marine Insurance
Co., 2 Cliff. 394, 417, 418-419 (ist Circ., 1864). See also MOLLOY, op. cit., Book I,
C. 4, § I; I KENT COAM. 172; 1 OPPENHEIM, Op. Cit., § 278.
15 See i HYDE, Op. Cit, § 231; 1 OPPENHEIM, Op. cit., § 280. "The legislative
authority of a state may doubtless enlarge the definition of the crime of piracy,
but the state must confine the operation of the new definition to its own citizens
and to foreigners on its own vessels." Clifford, J., in Dole v. New England Mutual
Marine Insurance Co., 2 Cliff. 394, 417 (ist Circ., 1864).
Similarly, acts not piratical by the law of nations may be declared piracy by
treaty. In the opinion just quoted, Mr. Justice Clifford said: " Two states also
may agree by treaty to regard as piracy a particular crime which is not so defined
in the international code, and the stipulation will be obligatory upon the contracting parties. The effect of such a treaty is in general to give to both the
contracting parties jurisdiction over that offence for the trial and punishment of
such of the citizens of the two countries as commit the offence, but the operation of such a treaty has no bearing on other nations." 2 Cliff. at 417. See The
Bello Corrunes, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 152, 171 (1821). See FED. CRuIM. CODE, § 305,
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There seems to be little that is indicative of such confusion in
the English law prior to American independence. Until the
middle of the fourteenth century, it is said, piracy by the law of
nations was punished in England at common law as petit treason
if committed by a subject and as felony if committed by a
foreigner.'
Certainly it was not punished with satisfactory effect. At the middle of the century it was omitted from a statutory enumeration of the offences constituting treason; " and
only a few years later, with the first investiture of the Admiral
with maritime jurisdiction, it became an offence cognizable in
admiralty. 8 In his excellent introduction to Select Pleas in the
Court of Admiralty, 9 Mr. Reginald G. Marsden has pointed
out that it was chiefly because of the difficulties experienced in
dealing with pirates that the court of the Lord High Admiral was
first created."

From 1361 until 1536, it was the usual course to

try cases of piracy, both civil and criminal, in the Admiral's
court.2 '
The admiralty jurisdiction of piracy cases on the criminal side
was handicapped by the civil law rule that a death sentence could
not be pronounced without either a confession or direct proof by
eye-witnesses," and possibly by common-law jealousy as well.
35

STAT. AT L. IO88, "147. See also Art. 3 of the Treaty of Feb. 6, 1922, between
the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan, relative to the use in
war of submarines and noxious gases. 3 TREATIES BETWEEN '
UNITED STATES
AND OTIEE POWERS, 1910-1923, p. 3118.
:6 COKE, INST. III., c. 49; HAWx. P. C., Book I, c. 37, §§i, 2. The present
writer has not verified the accuracy of this statement. See Marsden's introduction
to " Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty," 6 SLDEx Soc., xli.
1 See 25 EDW. III., "Declaration what offences shall be adjudged treason,"
in I HALE P. C., c. 12.
18 See MARSDEN,

op. cit., 6 SELDN Soc., xlii, xlv.

19 6 SELDEN Soc., i.
20 At pp. xiv et seq.

See E. S. Roscoe, "Mediaeval Piracy and the Lords
High Admiral of England," 24 LAW MAG. AND REV. (4th Series), 144.
21 See MARSDEN, op. cit., 6 SELDEN Soc., xlv.
22 " Where traytors, pirates, thieves, robbers, murderers and confederates upon
the sea, many times escaped unpunished, because the trial of their offences hath
heretofore been ordered, judged and determined before the admiral, or his lieutenant or commissary, after the course of the civil laws, the nature whereof is,
that before any judgement of death can be given against the offenders, either they
must plainly confess their offences (which they will never do without torture or
pains) or else their offences be so plainly and directly proved by witness indifferent, such as saw their offences committed, which cannot be gotten but by
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In 1536 it was provided by statute 23 that piracies should be tried
thereafter pursuant to royal commission directed to the Admiral
or his deputy and to three or four other substantial persons
designated by the Lord Chancellor. The trials were to be conducted "after the common course of the laws of this realm."
Among the commissioners it became the practice to include some
of the common-law judges; and by courts of admiralty thus constituted the offence of piracy was thereafter tried. The tribunal
was an innovation and the procedure may have been somewhat
improved, but the nature of the offence remained unchanged.2"
There were some famous trials at the Old Bailey under the
Eventually the difficulties experienced
Statute of Henry VIII."
in bringing pirates from remote places to England for trial led
to further legislation authorizing trials at sea or in the colonies.2"
The tribunals thus authorized were' to be constituted pursuant
to royal commission and the trials were to be conducted "accordchance at few times, because such offenders commit their offences upon the sea,
and at many times murder and kill such persons being in the ship or boat where
they commit their offences, which should witness against them in that behalf;
and also such as should bear witness be commonly mariners and shipmen, which,
because of their often voyages and passages in the seas, depart without long
tarrying and protraction of time, to the great costs and charges as well of the
King's highness, as such as would pursue such offenders: for reformation whereof,
be it enacted. . . 2' 28 HEN. VIII., c. i5, Preamble.
23 28 HEN. VIII., c. 15, § I.
24 "But the 28 Hen. 8 merely altered the mode of trial in the Admiralty
Court; and its jurisdiction still continues to rest on the same foundations as it
did before that Act. It is regulated by the civil law, et per consuetudines nwrinas
grounded on the law of nations, which may possibly give to that Court a jurisdiction that our common law has not." i RUssELL, CRimES, 9th Am. from 4th
Eng. ed., 156. See Bonnet's Trial, I5 How. St. Tr. 1231, X236 (1718). And see
COKE, INST. III., C. 49; HAWK. P. C., Book I, c. 37, § 6; MOLLOY, op. cit., Book I,
c. 4, § 25. Thus accessories to piracy, not being named in the statute, remained
until 1700 cognizable by the civil law if the offence were committed within admiralty jurisdiction, and by no law if the offence were committed on land. In
i7oo another statute made them cognizable according to 28 Hen. VIII., c. ig, the
same as principals. il & 12 WM. III., c. 7, § io. See HAwK. P. C., Book I,
c. 37, § 7.
25 See Dawson's Trial, 13 How. St. Tr. 451 (1696); Kidd's Trial, 14 How. St.
Tr. 123 (1701).
26 See ii & 22 W21. III., C. 7, enacted originally to be in force for seven years,
but made perpetual by 6 GEo. I., c. ig, § 3. See Quelch's Trial, 24 How. St. Tr.
io67, 1074 (1704). , See also 4 GEo. I., c. I,, § 7; and 8 Gao. I., c. 24, made
perpetual by 2 GEo. II., c. 28, § 7.
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ing to the civil law, and the methods and rules of the admiralty."_2.7 So it came about that Captain John Quelch was
tried and convicted at Boston 2 8 and Major Stede Bonnet at
Charlestown.2"
IV
In America the development of the law of piracy took a new
turn with the achievement of independence and the adoption of
the Federal Constitution. The Constitution delegated power to
Congress
" To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offences against the law of nations." 3
It was apparently contemplated that the federal courts would
exercise jurisdiction to punish piracies and that reference to the
law of nations would sufficiently define the offence."' The
framers of the Constitution and of the first Judiciary Act would
probably have been surprised had they been told that the federal
law of crimes in the United States was to be wholly statutory and
that even an offence as ancient and abhorrent as piracy could be
a federal offence only as made so by act of Congress.a- So the
2
event proved, however."
Had Congress anticipated the event, it seem unlikely that
the first legislation in respect to piracy would have been so art27 Jr & 12 WM. III., C. 7, § 4.
28 Quelch's Trial, 14 How. St. Tr. IO67 (1704).
29 Bonnet's Trial, 15 How. St. Tr. 1231 (i718).
39 Art. I, § 8, cl. io.
31 Madison, writing in Th FEDERALIST, No. 42, said: " The provision of the
federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies, extends no farther than
to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offences. The definition of
piracies might, perhaps, without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations;
though a legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes. A
definition of felonies on the high seas, is evidently requisite."
32 There is evidence indicating that the Federal Judiciary Act of i789 was
intended to invest United States district and circuit courts with jurisdiction over
common-law crimes. See Charles Warren, "New Light on the History of the
Federal Judiciary.Act of 1789," 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 51, 73, 77.
-3 It was early settled that the United States courts have ng' common-law
jurisdiction in criminal cases. United States v. Hudson, 7 Craifd
(U. S.) 32
(1812); United States v. Coolidge, I Wheat. (U. S.) 415 (1816); United States v'.
Britton? 1o8 U. S. 199 (1883).
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lessly drafted as to leave piracy jure gentium and piracy by
municipal law in the utmost confusion. Five sections in the
Federal Crimes Act of 1790 were devoted to the subject. One
dealt particularly with attacks by citizens of the United States
upon the United States or its citizens on the high seas; another
with accessories before the fact of "any murder or robbery, or
other piracy aforesaid, upon the seas "; still another with accessories after the fact of "any murder, felony, robbery, or other
piracy whatsoever aforesaid "; and a fourth with manslaughter
at sea, conspiring, confederating, or trading with pirates, provoking mutiny, and so forth. 4
The principal provisions with respect to piracy were incorporated in Section 8. And what a jumble this section contained!
Three classes of offenders were enumerated: first, "any person
or persons" committing upon the sea outside the jurisdiction of
any state either murder, robbery, or any other offence which if
committed within the body of a county would be punishable
with death by the laws of the United States; second, "any
captain or mariner " piratically and feloniously running away
with his ship, or with goods worth as much as fifty dollars, or
voluntarily surrendering his ship to pirates; and third, "any seaman" laying violent hands upon his commander, to prevent him
from fighting in defence of ship or cargo, or inciting revolt on
the ship. All three classes of offenders were denounced as
pirates and felons who should suffer death.3 5
34 Act of April 30, 1790,

§§ 9,

io, 1I,

312; 1 STAT. AT L. 112, 114-115.

35 The text of § S is as follows: " That if any person or persons shall commit
upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction
of any particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offence which if committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the United States be
punishable with death; or if any captain or mariner of any ship or other vessel,
shall piratically and feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods
or merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his phip or goods
committed to his trust, or shall make a revolt in the ship; every such offender
shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon, and being thereof
convicted, shall suffer death; and the trial of crimes committed on the high seas,
or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the
district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought."
x STAT. AT L. 113, 114.

"It

is obvious that the'penman who drafted the section under consideration,
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Confusion in the application of such a statute was a foregone
consequence. In so far as it might be thought to provide for
the punishment of pirates jure gentium, it was applicable to the
nationals of all countries for acts committed on the ships of any
flag. In so far as it made certain acts piratical by the law
peculiar to the United States, it could be applicable only to
American nationals or on American ships. But who could tell
from the text where one left off and the other began? The problem was not likely to be serious so long as the cases presented
only offences committed on American vessels."
Eventually,
however, more troublesome questions were bound to come before
the courts.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court was United States v.
Palmer,17 decided in i818. Palmer and Wilson, mariners, late of
Boston, and Callaghan, mariner, late of Newburyport, were
indicted for piracy under Section 8 of the Act of 1790 in the
Circuit Court for the Massachusetts district. The court consisted
of Justices Story and Davis. These judges being of different
opinions, no fewer than eleven questions were certified to the
Supreme Court. The transcript stated no case, and it is impossible to ascertain from the record just what the facts were.
The indictment suggested, however, and contemporary reports
confirm, that the prisoners were American citizens and that the
offence was robbery committed upon a Spanish vessel on the
high seas. 8 The Supreme Court gave inter alia an opinion upon
the meaning of Section 8 as follows:
"that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the high seas,
on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of a
acted from an indistinct view of the divisions of his subject. He has blended all
crimes punishable under the admiralty jurisdiction in the general term of piracy."
Johnson, J., in United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 184, 196 (1820).
36 See United States -v. Tully, z Gall. 247 (ist Circ., 1812) ; United States v.
Ross, i Gall. 624 (ist Circ., 1813). Cf. United States v. M'Gill, 4 DalI. (U. S.)
426 (I806); United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 336 (1i8). See z6
GREEx BAG 172. See also United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 209 (3rd Circ.,
x813); United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. 228 (3rd Circ., I814).
37 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 61o (i818).
38 The facts in United States v. Palmer are stated as follows in the report of
United States v. Chapels, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 205, 2o6 (Circ. D. Va., i819):
"Palmer and others, citizens of the United States, had gone upon the high seas,
entered and robbed the Industria Raffaeli, a Spanish ship, of various articles."
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foreign state, on persons within a vessel belonging also exclusively to
subjects of a foreign state, is not piracy within the true intent and
meaning of the act."

30

From this opinion it was only natural to infer that the Supreme
Court regarded Section 8 as exclusively a statutory definition of
piracy by the municipal law of the United States, not including
provisions for the trial and punishment in United States courts
of pirates by the law of nations."0
Thus interpreted, however, the decision in United States v.
Palmer would have limited much the scope and efficacy of this
section. The decision was not well received. That it left the
law with respect to piracy more restricted than it had been supposed to be was made evident when Congress promptly enacted
a new statute, the Act of March 3, 1819, to supply the omission
which the Supreme Court had discovered. 4
Section 5 of the
Act of 1819, enacted to be in force until the end of the next

session of Congress, provided as follows:
" That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and
such offender or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or found
in the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, before the circuit court of the United States for the
39 3 Wheat. (U. S.) at 643. See United States v. Howard, 3 Wash. C. C.
340, 344, 345 (3rd Circ., 1818); United States v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 144,
15X (1820).
40 Kent says: "In the case of the United States v. Palmer, it was held, that
the act of Congress of 1790 was intended to punish offences against the United
States, and not offences against the human race; and that the crime of robbery,
committed by a person who was not a citizen of the United States, on the high
seas, on board of a ship belonging exclusively to subjects of a foreign state, was
not piracy under the act, and was not punishable in the courts of the United
States. The offence, in such a case, must, therefore, be left to be punished by the
nation under whose flag the vessel sailed, and within whose particular jurisdiction
all on board the vessel were." i KENT Comm. x74. It is believed that Kent was
mistaken in referring to the case as robbery "by a person who was not a citizen
of the United States." See supra, note 38.
41 See the report of United States v. Chapels, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 205,
207 (Circ. D. Va., 1819); the remark of Winder, counsel, arguing in United States
v. Klintock, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 144, Y49 (I820); United States v. Kessler, Fed.
Cas. No. 15,528, pp. 766, 772 (3rd Circ., 1829). See also 2 WARmEN, SUPREaE
COURT IN UNITED STATES H sTORY, 38.
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district into which he or they may be brought, or in which he or they
shall be found, be punished with death." 4_
It may be suspected that the Supreme Court was not insensible
to criticism of its decision in United States v. Palmer and to
the prompt action of Congress in meeting that decision's challenge
by incorporating Section 5 in the Act of 1819. In any event, in
the leading case of United States v. Smith," decided in 1820,
the Supreme Court held that Section 5 was a constitutional exercise of the power of Congress to define and punish piracies, and
that piracy in the law of nations was robbery upon the sea.44
And in a notable group of cases, decided in the same year, the
Court did much to mitigate the effect of the Palmer case and to
reinject significance into Section 8 of the Act of 1790.
Of the cases constituting this notable group, United States v.
Klintock " was the first and most important. The case began in
an indictment for piracy of a citizen of the United States who
had sailed as first lieutenant on a vessel owned without the
United States and commissioned by one styling himself Brigadier
of the Mexican Republic and Generalissimo of the Floridas. The
prisoner was found guilty of seizing a Danish vessel on the high
seas. On motion for arrest of judgment, the judges were divided
and questions were certified to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court was of opinion that the commission did not exempt the
prisoner from the charge of piracy, that the acts charged were
piratical acts, that the prisoner was punishable under Section 8
of the Act of 179o, and that Section 8 extended to "all persons
on board all vessels which throw off their national character by
cruizing piratically and committing piracy on other vessels.""
Chief Justice Marshall said:
4- 3 STAT. AT L. 510, 513, 514.
43 5 Wheat. (U. S.) I53 (1820).

See the same case in the circuit court, United
States v. Chapels, Fed. Cas. No. 14,782 (D. Va., i8ig).
44 In United States v. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 184, 204 (1820), decided in
the same year, the Supreme Court reiterated that " the 5th section of the act
of the 3d of March, i8ig, furnishes a sufficient definition of piracy, and that it is

defined 'robbery on the seas.' "
On probable cause for seizure under the Act of 18ig, see The Marianna Flora,
xx Wheat. (U. S.) 1 (1826); The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 1 (1827).
45 5 Wheat. (U. S.) i44 (1820).
46 5 Wheat. (U. S.) at 193.
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" Upon the most deliberate reconsideration of that subject, the Court
is satisfied, that general piracy, or murder, or robbery, committed in
the places described in the 8th section, by persons on board of a
vessel not at the time belonging to the subjects of any foreign power,
but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no government whatever, is within the true meaning of this act, and is punishable in the Courts of the United States.
Persons of this description are proper objects of the penal code of all
nations; and we think that the general words of the act of Congress
applying to all persons whatsoever, though they ought not to be so
construed as to extend to persons under the acknowledged authority of
a foreign State, ought to be so construed as to comprehend those who
acknowledge the authority of no State. Those general terms ought
not to be applied to offences committed against the particular
sovereignty of a foreign power; but we think they ought to be applied to offences committed against all nations, including the United
States, by persons who by common consent are equally amenable to
7
the laws of all nations." 4
At the same time that United States v. Klintock was decided,
the Supreme Court had before it several other cases arising on indictments for piratical acts under Section 8 of the Act of 1790.
48
These cases are reported together as United States v. Pirates.
In one case, United States v. Bowers and Mathews, the Supreme
Court held again, following United States v. Klintock, that Section 8 extended to piracy committed on one foreign vessel by the
crew of another foreign vessel which had "assumed the character of pirates, whereby they lost all claim to national character
or protection." " In another case, United States v. Furlong, the
prisoner was a British subject indicted for the piratical murder
of another British subject on a British ship. His own ship was
a United States vessel which -had been stolen by captain and
crew. He was found guilty. A motion was made in arrest of
judgment because, among other reasons, he had not been
charged as a citizen of the United States and because the act
had not been charged as committed on a United States vessel.
47 5 Wheat. (U. S.) at 152.

See the remark of Johnson, J., in United States
192-193 (1820).
And see I KENT CoaMM. x75.
48 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 184 (1820).
49 5 Wheat. (U. S.) at 205.

v. Pirates, g Wheat. (U. S.) x84,
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The judges of the Circuit Court being divided in opinion, the
record was certified to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
held that the indictment need not charge the prisoner as a
citizen of the United States nor the crime as having been committed on board a United States vessel. It was enough to
charge it as having been committed from on board a United
States vessel by a mariner sailing on board a United States
vessel.?°
It thus appears that the first class of offenders enumerated
in Section 8 of the Act of I 79o, described as "any person or
persons" committing murder, robbery, or other capital offence
upon the high seas, might include (i) persons committing the
forbidden acts on or from vessels of the United States, (2)
persons committing the forbidden acts on or from piratical
vessels, and (3) persons assuming the character of pirates and
committing the forbidden acts on or from any vessels whatsoever. Section 8 did extend after all, therefore, to piracies jure
gentium, but only to those piracies jure gentium, it seems, in
which an intention of universal hostility was manifested by an
assumption of the familiar piratical character.
The subsequent history of legislation in the United States
with respect to the crime of piracy is of considerable interest
and importance. Section 5 of the Act of 1819, as already
indicated, had been enacted to be in force only until the end
of the next session of Congress."' Before the session expired,
Congress passed another statute, the Act of May 15, 1820, continuing in force the earlier statute in part and making further
provisions for punishing piracy.5 2 With respect to Section 5 of
the Act of 1819, the new law provided that it should be "continued in force" without limitation as to time "as to all crimes
made punishable by the same, and heretofore committed." 11
The provision was phrased in terms of continuation, but the
effect was to let Section 5 expire. In lieu of Section 5,the Act
50 5 Wheat. (U. S.) at 203.
412 (1820).

See United States v. Holmes, 5 Wheat. (U. S.)

See also REPORT oF Co~MMssIoN TO REVISE CRn

NA.

UNITED STATES, 57th Cong., ist Sess., Sen. Doc. No. 68, Pt. 2, pp.
KENT CO2MM. 175; 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, § 311.

51 § 6; 3 STAT. AT L. 91o, 5"4.
52 3 STAT. AT L. 6oo,

53 § 2,

LAWS OF

Mxv-xxvii; I
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of 1820 provided in Section 3 that robbery upon the high seas
or within the ebb and flow of the tide should be piracy punishable with death." Congress had probably intended to supersede
Section 8 of the Act of 179o by Section 5 of the Act of 1819;
and clearly the latter enactment was intended to be replaced by
Section 3 of the Act of 182o. Nevertheless, each of fhese three
sections was reenacted, with minor textual revisions, in the Revised Statutes of 1874." Indeed, the entire substantive content of the early statutes with respect to piracy reappeared in
the Revised Statutes. 6 Revision and rearrangement accomplished minor improvements, but otherwise all the old ambiguities were carefully preserved.
More radical changes were made in the Federal Criminal
Code of i909. That part of Section 8 of the Act of 1790 which
had been the source of so much confusion in the early period
was finally repealed. Instead of ambiguously denouncing murder, robbery, or other piracies upon the seas, in terms which
51 The text of § 3 is as follows: "That, if any person shall, upon the high
seas, or in any open roadstead, or in any haven, basin, or bay, or in any river
where the sea ebbs and flows, commit the crime of robbery, in or upon any
ship or vessel, or upon any of the ship's company of any ship or vessel, or the
lading thereof, such person shall be adjudged to be a pirate: and, being thereof
convicted before the circuit court of the United States for the district into which
he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death. And if
any person engaged in any piratical cruise or enterprise, or being of the crew or
ship's company of any piratical ship or vessel, shall land from such ship or vessel,
and, on shore, shall commit robbery, such person shall be adjudged a pirate: and
on conviction thereof before the circuit court of the United States for the district
into which he shall be brought, or in which he shall be found, shall suffer death:
Provided, That nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive any
particular state of its jurisdiction over such offences, when committed within the
body of a county, or authorize the courts of the United States to try any such
offenders, after conviction or acquittance, for the same offence, in a state court."
See United States v. Kessler, Fed. Cas. No. 15,528 (3rd Circ., 1829), holding
§ 3 inapplicable to robbery committed on a foreign vessel.
5 §§ 5372, 5368, and 5370 respectively. The inclusion of § 5 of the Act of
i819 more than a half century after it had expired is difficult to explain otherwise
than as an "accident of revision."
See REPORT OF Coaa-sslOx To REvlSE
CRImnAL LAWS, cited supra, note 5o.
50 Coml~are Act of 1790, §§ 8, 9, 10, i, 12 (1 STAT. AT L. 112) with REv.
STAT. §§ 5372, 5383, 5369, 5373, 5323, 5324, 5384. Compare Act of isig, §§ I, 2,
3, 4, 5 (3 STAT. AT L. 51o) with REv. STAT. §§ 4293, 4294, 4295, 4296, 5368. Compare Act of 1820, §§ 3, 4, 5 (3 STAT. AT L. 6oo) with REv. STAT. §§ 5370, 5371,
53.76. 5375. Compare Act of 1847 (9 STAT. AT L. 175) with REv. STAT. § 5374.
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would have made it impossible to distinguish piracy in municipal law and piracy jure gentium, Chapter 12 of the Criminal
Code begins with the simple rule, first explicitly and unequivocally announced in Section 5 of the Act of 18i9, that "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined
by the lav of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found
in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life." 17
The result is that, at the present day, United States v. Palmer,5 8 United States v. Klintock, 5 and the other cases arising
under Section 8 of the Act of 179o, are chiefly of historical
significance. The rule now in force derives directly from Section 5 of the Act of i8i9.

United States v. Smith 60 is the lead-

ing case in expositioh. In the latter case, it may do no harm to
repeat, the Supreme Court laid it down in no uncertain terms
that it is competent for Congress to define piracy by reference
to the law of nations and that "its true definition by that law
is robbery upon the sea."
V
So it is that the modern law of piracy in America has been
derived principally from the law of nations, by virtue of federal
statute, and that the crime of piracy by that law has been
commonly defined as robbery upon the sea. Is piratical robbery at sea essentially different from ordinary robbery on land?
The classical definitions of piracy indicate that it is not, and
suggest strongly that there is a difference only as regards the
locus of the crime. Yet some reluctance has been manifested
about making the definition so comprehensive. It has been
suggested that the true international pirate must intend to rob
and plunder without discrimination in defiance of all authority.
57 FED. CRIM. CODE, § 290. Compare Act of 1790, § 8 (x STAT. AT L. 112)
with REV. STAT. §§ 5372, 5383, 5369, and also with FED. CRmr. CODE, §§ 306,
294 (35 STAT. AT L. io88). Compare also Act of i82o, § 3 (3 STAT. AT L. 600)
with PEv. STAT. §§ 5370; 5371, and with FED. CRnI. CODE, § 302. Compare Act of
1790, §§ 9, 10, II, 12, with FED. CRIM. CODE, §§ 304, 332, 334, 307; and Act of
1847 (o STAT.'AT L. 175) with FED. CmR. CODE, § 305.
58 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 6io (i818). See supra, p. 344.
59 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 144 (1820). See supra, p. 346.
60 5 Wheat. (U. S.) i53 (1820). See supra, p. 346.
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Only those who are hostes humani generis, it has been said, are
the subjects of universal jurisdiction.
It is of considerable importance that there be no confusion
about the significance of the proposition that pirates jure
gentium are hostes humani generis. Is the jurisdiction universal because they are hostes humani generis, or are they said to
be hostes humani generis because the jurisdiction is universal?
Does the proposition state a prerequisite or a consequence?
Does it describe a constituent element of the offence of piracy
or, only a reprehensible quality or characteristic which the law
attributes to pirates? It is evident that the applicability of the
law of piracy to modern marauders on the sea, including the
"hi-jackers," for example, may depend much upon the correct
answers to these questions.
That pirata est hostis humani generis has been asserted many
times, but not in a way to suggest so much a constituent element of the offence as an epithet of opprobrium which the ofCharging the jury in Kidd's Trial,62 Mr.
fence deserves.6
Justice Turton said: "Pirates are called 'Hostes humani
generis,' the enemies to all mankind." He did not suggest that
they must be enemies of all mankind to be pirates. In Bonnet's
Trial,6 3 Judge Trott remarked: "As to the heinousness or
wickedness of the offence, it needs no aggravation, it being evident to the reason of all men. Therefore a pirate is called
'hostis humani generis,' with whom neither faith nor oath is to
be kept." The obvious implication was that they are called
enemies of all mankind because of the enormity of their offence. "'Hostis humani generis,'" observed Dr. Tindall, "is
61 See CoXE, INST. III., c. 49; i WAtNNm, LiFE OF JENxINS, Lxxxvi; MOLLOY,
op. cit, Book I, c. 4, § 1; i KNT Comm. 171-72.
62 14 How. St. Tr. 123, 212 (1701).
63 15 How. St. Tr. 1231, 1235 (17x8). Charging a ftderal grand jury at Boston,
October x6, i86r, judge Sprague said: "Pirates are generally described as searobbers. "They are deemed hostes hunain generis, enemies of mankind, warring
against the human race. The ocean is the common highway of nations, over
which every government has criminal jurisdiction. Pirates are highwaymen of
the sea, and all civilized nations have a common interest, and are under a moral
obligation, to arrest and suppress them." 2 Sprague, 285, 286 (D. Mass., 1861).
Here the suggestion seems to be that pirates are called enemies of mankind because of the universal interest in security upon the common highways of the sea.
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neither a definition, or as much as a description of a pirate, but
a rhetorical invective to shew the odiousness of that crime." 64
It seems reasonably clear that English and American courts
have used hostis humani generis as an invective rather than a
definition. In addition to a considerable number of cases in
which the accused has been charged with a single depredation
and convicted, without proof of more than the usual felonious
intent, there have been a number of cases demonstrating even
more obviously that universal hostility or the intention to plunder without discrimination is not an element of the offence.
There are a few cases, for example, in which seizures made by
the naval forces of unrecognized insurgents have been regarded
as piratical. Seizures by the duly commissioned agents of a
recognized government are not piratical. 5 Neither are seizures
made by recognized belligerents in the legitimate prosecution of
hostilities. 8 But captures made or attempted by the naval
forces of unrecognized insurgents have given the courts greater
difficulty, and in a few instances have been denounced as piracy
jure gentium." Such a conclusion seems erroneous, since insurgents seize for a public political end rather than for private
plunder, and it is believed that the conclusion would generally
be regarded as erroneous at the present day.
It is worth
noting, however, that the cases arriving at this conclusion have
Commenting upon the examination of the civilians by the Cabinet Council
1269, 1271 note (1693).
65 Davison v. Seal-skins, 2 Paine, 324 (2nd Circ., 1833). See I OPPE
,
op. cit, § 273. But compare J. E. G. de Montmorency, " The Barbary States in
International Law," 4 TRANS. GROTIUS Soc. 87; and " Piracy and the Barbary
Corsairs," 35 L. QUART. REv. 133; arguing that it is possible to have pirate states
in international law.
66 See Opinion of Attorney General Butler, 3 Op. ATTY. GEN. 120 (1836);
Dole v. Merchants' Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 5i Me. 465 (2863); Dole v.
New England Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 6 Allen (Mass.) 373 (1863); Dole
v. New England Mutual "Marine Insurance Co., 2 Cliff. 394 (ist Circ., 1864);
Fifield v. Insurance Co., 47 Pa. St. 166 (1864); The Schooner Chapman, 4 Sawy.
5oi (N. D. Cal., 1864).
67 See Golding's Trial, 22 How. St. Tr. 1269 (1693); The Ambrose Light, 25
Fed. 408 (S. D. N. Y., i885). See also 32 ALBANY L. J. 65. Cf. United States v.
Hutchings, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cas. 543 (Circ. D. Va., 1817).
Ps See I HYDE, INTERxATI NAL LAW, § 233; i OppENHmEI, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 3 ed., § 273; WIESSE, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL APPLIQUE AUX GuERRES
64

of England prior to Golding's Trial, i2 How. St. Tr.

CIVILES, § 27; 22 MicH. L. REv. 120.
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repudiated emphatically the notion that no one is a pirate unless
he hoists the skull and crossbones and plunders without
discrimination.69
More significant, no doubt, are those cases in which the
seizure of a single ship by persons having no thought of going
on a piratical cruise or in which sporadic acts of violence by
mere amateurs in "the grand account" have been denounced as
piracy jure gentium. Two English extradition cases are of particular interest in this connection.
In the case of In re Tivnan,0 some persons took ship as passengers in 1863 on an American schooner bound from Matamoras to New York. After the schooner had put out from port,
these passengers seized her, put the captain and crew ashore,
and disappeared with the ship. There was some evidence which
indicated that they might have been acting for the Confederate
Government. Three of them were later apprehended in Liver69 In Dole v. Merchants' Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 5y Me. at 468-469,
commenting upon the contention that no one is a pirate who is not hostis hurnani
generis, Mr. Justice Davis said: " This may, generally, be true in fact. But it
by no means follows that such indiscriminate hostility is necessary to constitute
the crime of piracy.... No one has ever contended that a man could not be
convicted of robbery, unless he had a general purpose to rob everybody. Such a
rule is no more applicable to robbery on the seas, than on the land. If an act
of piracy is proved, it surely would not be a good defence for the pirates, that
their purpose was to seize vessels belonging to citizens of one nation only; or
even that the piratical enterprise was designed for the taking of only a single ship.
...The fact that pirates generally have a wider and more indiscriminate
purpose, has given rise to more general terms in describing what they do. But
we are not aware that any court has ever held an act of robbery, committed on
the high seas, not to be piracy; or that any other elements are necessary to constitute the offence." See also the remark of Woodward, C. J., in Fifield v. Insurance Co., 47 Pa. St. 166, 169 (1864).
In The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408, 424 (S. D. N. Y., 1885), judge Brown
said: "The ' intention of universal hostility,' in any special sense, is applicable to
pirates by profession only; to those who make piracy a business, and live by
some approach to indiscriminate plunder, and who in that sense are 'general
pirates.' In other words, it is a description of the supposed practice of one
class of pirates only; just as the animus furandi is descriptive of the particular
motive of most piracies. But neither the general intent in the one case, nor the
particular and common motive of plunder in the other, is necessary or essential
to the offense of piracy itself. And it is manifest that the offense may be as
complete, though but a single act be committed or intended, as if such acts were
practiced as a business, and indiscriminately on all vessels, to procure a livelihood."
7o 5 Best & S. 645 (x864).
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pool and held for extradition to the United States on a charge
of piracy. It was held that they were entitled to be discharged
because piracy "committed within the jurisdiction" of either
of the high contracting parties, as stipulated in the extradition
treaty and the act for giving effect thereto,7 meant piracy by
municipal law and not piracy by the law of nations. The court
was clearly of opinion that if these prisoners had committed
piracy it was piracy by the law of nations.7
In Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing,73 the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had occasion to go even
further than the Court of Queen's Bench went in the Tivnan
case. A French vessel had sailed from Macao in China bound
for Peru with three hundred and ten Chinese coolie emigrants
on board, among them Kwok-a-Sing. While the vessel was on
the high seas, Kwok-a-Sing and others killed the captain and
several of the crew and compelled the remaining seamen to return with the ship to China. The vessel was beached and abandoned on the Chinese coast. Kwok-a-Sing was later apprehended
in Hong Kong, and China requested his extradition; but the
Supreme Court of Hong Kong ordered his discharge on the
ground that if piracy had been committed it was piracy jure
gentium, outside the scope of the extradition ordinances and
treaties. He was then arrested on the charge of piracy jure
gentium. A second writ of habeas corpus issued and he was
again ordered discharged. On appeal to the Judicial Committee,
however, this second order was reversed. It was held that there
was sufficient evidence to justify trial on the charge of piracy
by the law of nations.74
71 See Treaty of 1824, ATt. 1o, I TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER POWERS, I776-I9o9, p. 655; 6 & 7 VicT., c. 76, § I. '
= 5 Best & S. at 677, 680, 684, 685, 689. " Piracy by the law of nations" was
enumerated among the extraditable offences in the Extradition Convention of
July 12, 1889, between Great Britain and the United States. I TREATIES BETWEEN

THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER POWERS, 7776-ig09, pp. 740, 741.
EXTRADITION, §§ 110-113.

See I MOORE,

L. R. 5 P. C. i79 (1873).
Lord Justice Mellish said: "Now, their Lordships are of opinion that
there was before the magistrate sufficient priind facie evidence that Kwok-a-Sing
had committed an act of piracy jure gentium to justify his committal for trial
for that offence at Hong Kong. They see no reason to doubt that the charge of
Sir Charles Hedges, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, to the Grand Jury,
73

74
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In both the above cases it was clearly indicated that the
seizure of a single ship by persons having no intention of universal hostility might be piracy by the law of nations. A case
of a different sort, but pointing to the same conclusion, is United
States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 5 in which some curiously amateurish acts of violence in execution of a purpose quite incomprehensible from the record were denounced as piratical dcts. The
case was a libel for piratical aggressions under the Act of
March 3, 1819.76

The Brig Malek Adhel had sailed from New

York for Guaymas on a commercial voyage. The owners neither
authorized nor contemplated acts of piracy. Various aggressions were committed on the voyage, however, including the
stopping of other vessels with blank shot, or with solid shot if
blanks were unheeded, requiring petty services, firing on them
if they refused to comply with requests, and, in the case of a
Portuguese vessel, taking a jar of sweetmeats, a dog, and
twenty dollars in money. The United States Supreme Court
affirmed a decree condemning the ship.
Speaking for the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Story expressed
the opinion that the statute was intended to carry the rule of
the law of nations into effect, and continued as follows:
"Where the act uses the word 'piratical,' it does so in: a general sense;
importing that the aggression is unauthorized by the law of nations,
hostile in its character, wanton and criminal in its commission, and
utterly without any sanction from any public authority or sovereign
power. In short, it means that the act belongs to the class of offences which pirates are in the habit of perpetrating, whether they, do
it for purposes of plunder, or for purposes of hatred, revenge, or
wanton abuse of power. A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed,
hostis humani generis. But why is he so deemed? Because he commits hostilities upon the subjects and property of any or all 7 nations,
without any regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority.
If he wilfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any
as reported in the case of Rex v. Dawson, [x3 State Trials 454] and which was
made in the presence and with the approval of Chief Justice Holt, and several
other Common Law Judges, contains a correct exposition of the Law as to what
constitutes piracy jure gentium." L. R. 5 P. C. at i99. See supra, n. 6.
7,

2

76
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other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it is just
as inuch a piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of nations, and
of the act of Congress, as if he did it solely and exclusively for the
sake of plunder, lucri causa. The law looks to it as an act of hostility,
and being committed by a vessel not commissioned and engaged in
lawful warfare, it treats it as the act of a pirate, and of one who is
emphatically hostis hununi generis." 78
One other notable case is worthy of special mention as
demonstrating that an intention of universal hostility is not a
requisite element of the offence of piracy jure gentium. An insurrection broke out in 1851 in the Chilean garrison of the convict settlement at Punta Arenas. The insurgents seized a
British and also an American vessel lying in port, murdered the
masters and owners, plundered the vessels of part at least of
their cargoes, and put out to sea. Both vessels were later retaken, together with more than three hundred of the insurrectos,
by a British sloop of war. The case of The Magellan Pirates"
arose on a petition, filed on behalf of the British sloop, praying
the High Court of Admiralty to determine, pursuant to an act
of Parliament of 185o, that certain of the persons captured were
pirates, and to ascertain the number thereof so that the usual
application for bounty might be made. The court held that the
captured insurrectos were pirates within the meaning of the
statute.
Dr. Lushington said:
"Now, how am I to determine who are pirates, except by the acts
that they have committed? I apprehend that, in the administration of
our criminal law, generally speaking, all persons are held to be pirates
who are found guilty of piratical acts; and piratical acts are robbery
and murder upon the high seas. I do not believe that, even where
human life was at stake, our Courts of Common Law ever thought it
necessary to extend their inquiries further, if it was clearly proved
against the accused that they had committed robbery and murder upon
the high seas. In that case they were adjudged to be pirates, and suffered accordingly. Whatever may have been the definition in some of
the books . ..it was never, so far as I am able to find, deemed necessary to inquire whether parties so convicted of these crimes had in78 2

How.

(U.

S.)

at 232.

79 i

Spink, Si (1853).
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tended to rob on the' high seas, or to murder on the high seas
indiscriminately." 80
While the suggestion that pirates must intend to rob or
murder indiscriminately cannot be accepted, as Mr. Justice
Story, Dr. Lushington, and others have amply demonstrated, it
need not follow that every robbery or murder upon the seas is
internationally piratical. It is evident that some of our definitions, taken literally, are much too broad. There may be robberies or murders upon the seas which are not appropriate subjects of an international jurisdiction. The distinction may be
made with difficulty in some cases. But the difficulty should
not be insuperable if it is remembered that piracy jure gentium,
while it involves grievous wrong to individual rights of person
or property and a grave offence against the state most immediately concerned, is primarily and above all an offence against
the security of trade or travel upon the international highways
of the sea. 1
The distinction may be made clearer by illustration. If a
passenger should be killed during a piratical attack upon a ship
at sea, the offence might well be regarded as piratical murder
within the jurisdiction of any maritime state.. But if one passenger, a national of State A, should kill another passenger, a
national of State B, on board a'ship of State C, it would seem
clear that the offence ought not to be regarded as piratical jure
gentium and that jurisdiction could properly be taken only by
State A or State C. Similarly, if one passenger should rob
another passenger on a ship of State C on the high seas, while
the offence might conceivably be regarded as piracy jure
gentium within the definitions commonly approved by English
80 1 Spink at 83. See i HYDE, op. cit., § 232.
81 Oppenheim defines piracy jure gentium as " every unauthorized act of violence against persons or goods committed on the open sea either by a private
vessel against another vessel or by the mutinous crew or passengers against their
own vessel." I OPPENHEMh, op. cit., § 272. For further definitions and discussion from an international viewpoint, see Gebert, "Die V6lkerrechtliche Denationalisierung der Piraterie," 26 ZEMTsCHIT AYR INTERmATIONALES REcHY, 8 et
seq.; x ORTOLrAx, DIPLoMATIE DE LA MER, 4 ed., 207 et seq.; PERELS, SEERECHT,
§§ 16 et seq.; 5 PRADIER-FoDiRf,

TRAI'p DE DROIr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC, §§ 2491

et seq.; STiL, DEa TATBFSTAND DER PIATERIE NACH: GELTENDEM V.5L'ERRECT,
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and American courts, it would seem more' appropriate to regard
it as a case of ordinary robbery and leave jurisdiction either to
State C or to the state of the offender's allegiance. Moreover,
if definitions approved by English and American courts be construed with due regard to the facts presented in the cases in
which the definitions were laid down, there need be no difficulty
in arriving at this obviously sensible result. The jurisdiction
universal may be reserved for those offenders whose hostile
attacks upon ships either from without or from within constitute
a menace, not only to the interests of a single state, but also to
the interest which all maritime states have in the security of
shipping upon the highways of the sea.
Whether hostility be particular or universal, therefore, whether
the enterprise be undertaken under national ensign, the pirate
flag, or no flag at all, those who attack ships upon the high seas
without justification or authority to take or destroy property by
force or fear or wantonly to arrest or kill may be deemed pirates
by the law of nations and by the law of the United States. The
"hi-jackers," for example, are no less pirates than the pirates
of old. As Mr. Justice Story would have said, they are "emphatically hostes humani generis.!" 8

VI
By way of summary, then, it may be said that piracy by the
law of nations was punished in England, first at common law,
later in admiralty, and still later in special tribunals constituted
by royal commission. It was conceived as comprehending characteristically acts of robbery and occasionally other acts of unauthorized violence perpetrated upon the seas. And it was regarded as uniquely the subject of a jurisdiction universal.
82 There are substantial reasons why "hi-jackers" and their like should be
regarded as pirates. Depredations along the routes of commerce are a menace to
all maritime nations. Though first directed against particular individuals or
classes of individuals, there is always likelihood that violence will breed violence
and that presently the depredators may become less discriminating. In this
respect there is a moral in the experience of an earlier day when privateersmen
commissioned to make captures of the enemy so often turned pirate and plundered the ships of friendly countries.
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This was America's heritage from the laws of England. In
America, with the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the
enactment of some extraordinarily confusing federal legislation,
and the crystallization of the principle that federal criminal
jurisdiction is entirely statutory, there was initiated a period in
the development of the law of piracy which was curiously fruitless and unsatisfactory. Eventually the whole question was
simplified and clarified by the adoption, through legislationand by the preservation, through an accident of revision-of
the principle that piracy by the law of nations is an offence
punishable in the federal courts. In this wise the English heritage was eventually restored to its pristine significance.
The pirates infesting English seas in the middle ages were not
uniquely picturesque. For the most part they appear to have
been ordinary robbers who preferred the sea because of the lack
thereon of adequate protection for merchants and their fleets.
At a later day, piratical exlploits came to be associated with
buccaneers who sometimes donned turban, sash, and cutlass,
under the skull and crossbones. There has been a good deal
of unwarranted romanticism about freebooters of this type,
although some of them, no doubt, were real pirates picturesque.
However that may be, it was neither garb nor emblem that provoked the law's penalties. Misdeeds were the law's concern.
Then as now the law was concerned that ships should be secure
from depredation and violence upon the highways of the sea.
Probably it was the association of pirates picturesque with the
crime of piracy which inspired the notion that a pirate jure
gentium is one who declares war on all mankind. Repetition of
a metaphorical invective may have helped to make the idea
plausible. The peculiar development of the early cases arising
under Section 8 of the Act of 1790 probably contributed a
specious authority in support of the notion in the United States.
So far as the present writer has been able to ascertain, it is
nothing more than a notion without support in reason or
authority.
The writer began this essay with an inquiry as to the applicability of the law of piracy to "hi-jacking" at sea, yet the
interest in "hi-jacking" has been incidental. It is of importance, no doubt, to be able to conclude with a measure of con-
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fidence that such " hi-jackers" are pirates, but it is more important to emphasize generally the vitality of the law of piracy.
While the occasions for invoking its rules are less frequent now
than formerly, it may still be made a potent factor in preventing
lawlessness upon the seas. It belongs emphatically to the law
in reserve rather than to the law in history.
Edwin D. Dickinson.
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